


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Automated Negotiation from Declarative Contract Descriptions



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IBM TJ Watson Research

2000 July 31

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Designing a Negotiation Mechanism

- Example: FCC spectrum auctions
- Alternative structures
 - Independent auctions for frequencies
 - Combinatorial mechanism
 - Simultaneous ascending auctions
- How (and why) to automate the construction of a negotiation mechanism...
•

Contracts

- Descriptions of goods and services
- Applicable terms and conditions
 - ancillary agreements detailing terms of a deal
 - customer service agreements, delivery schedules, conditions for returns, usage restrictions, other issues...
- *Partial Contracts* extend this
 - Intuitively: contracts with “blanks” to be filled in
 - More formally: defines space of possible negotiation outcomes
-

Contracting Infrastructure

- Contracting language supports all 3 stages of commerce
- Contract progressively more complete




Formal Contracting Language



Automated Contracting

- Most effort to date on execution
- Our project: add



Formal Contracting Language


Formulating a Negotiation

- *What* to negotiate
 - **Price** of an otherwise fully specified contract
 - **Everything** of a completely empty contract
 - *Something in between...*
 - Negotiable parameters
 - Contracting issues to be determined in negotiation process
 - Flexibility/complexity tradeoffs
- 


Formulating a Negotiation: Criteria

- Coherence/feasibility (e.g., size & color inseparable)
- Communication requirements
- Computational efficiency
- Allocation efficiency
- Examples:
 - ability to bundle (seller)
 - complementarities (buyer)
 - fewer/simpler markets (auctioneer)
 -
 -
 -
 -

Overall Process (Partial → Complete)



Background Knowledge



Auction-Configuration Rulebase

- Partition negotiation into a set of components--separable bundle of goods
- Combine constraints between possible components, buyer/seller preferences
- Infer components to be negotiated
- Create arrays of 1-D auctions
- Priorities and mutual exclusion rules
 - E.g., only infer one value for each auction parameter

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Auction-Space Rulebase:

Domains, Defaults, and Constraints

- Domains for auction parameters
- Default values for all auction params
(lowest priority rules)
- Conditional defaults (next lowest priority)
 - 1 seller implies multiple buyers and vice versa
- Hard Constraints
 - <highest> auction(?ID, beatQuote, 0) <-
auction(?ID, meetQuote, 1).

•

Improved Parameterization

- Current parameterization in AuctionBot created incrementally and slow to change due to backward-compatibility constraints
 - Independent of actual AuctionBot parameters
 - Provides more *flexible* and *extensible* structure than a flat and complicated parameter space

Higher-Level Knowledge

- Infer auction parameters from negotiationType facts
- negotiationType used in partial contract for meta-level knowledge about negotiation
- Example:
 - negotiationType(continuous) implies negotiationType(continuousQuotes) implies auction(quoteMode, bid)
 -

Standard Auction Types

- Encodes well-known auction types
 - `negotiationType(CDA) => negotiationType(double)`, etc
 - Uses exceptions and special cases
 - Example: Amazon-style auctions are like eBay *except* that there is no fixed final clear time.

Additional Benefits

- Advantage of rule-based approach: adding new structure to parameterization
 - Example: inferring default parameter settings based on user profiles (business, consumer, skilled, novice, etc.)
 - Succinct: AuctionBot requires 27 individual parameter settings, as opposed to a handful of rules for most auctions
-

AuctionBot Rulebase

- Maps Auction-Space parameters to AuctionBot parameters
- Example: “auction type” inferred from fundamental auction parameters

```
<chronmatch> auctionbot( type , 4 )
<- auction( matchingfunction , earliesttime ) .
<cda> auctionbot( type , 5 )
<- auction( matchingfunction , earliesttime )
AND auction( intclearmode , 1 ) .

overrides( cda , chronmatch ) . /* special case */
```

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Domain-Specific Rules

(Components, Attributes, Values)

- Possible values
 - value(quality, regular) .
 - value(quality, deluxe) .
- Possible components and attributes
 - component(widget) .
 - attribute(widget, quality) .
- Possible values for widgets
 - value(?Component, quality, ?Q) <- component(?Component) AND value(quality, ?Q) .
 -


Trading Agent Example

- Generates all auctions for TAC
- 3 goods (flights, hotels, entertainment)
 - Each has attributes for day and for type
 - (2 flight types, in & out; 2 hotel types, good & bad; 3 entertainment types, baseball & symphony & theatre)
- Total auctions created per good:
 - [types]*[days]
- Negotiation-level rules included




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Goods in TAC Domain



Alternative Negotiation Structures



Agent Example

- Possible components: hotelblock, roundflight, flighthotel, entpackage, fullpackage, etc
 - (components may inherit features from each other)
- Constraints between components, e.g., buyers want hotelblocks xor individual rooms
- Buyer/seller preferences, e.g.:
 - buyer(traveler2, hotelblock).
 - seller(airline1, roundflight) .


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
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Simple Buyer/Seller Rules for

Alternative Negotiation Structure

```
buyer(traveler1, roundflight).  
buyer(traveler2, hotelblock).  
buyer(traveler1, entpackage).  
seller(airline1, roundflight).  
seller(hotel1, hotelblock).  
seller(agent3, entpackage).
```





Summary

- Contracting language as infrastructure for automated contracting
- Contracting framework
 - Partial to complete contracts
- Rule-based auction generation/configuration
- Alternative negotiation structures for TAC
- ContractBot prototype

Future Work

- Support for richer negotiation mechanisms (e.g., combinatorial and multiattribute auctions)
 - Extend ontology (e.g., orthogonality/separability)
 - Analyze agent strategies for submitting rules influencing the choice of negotiation mechanism
-

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
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Prototype details



Auction Constraints (additional details)

- Rules about rule priorities
 - 4-5 levels of priority useful in this application for expressing defaults, exceptions, overrides
 - low, medium, high/very-high
 - also: “standard” (no label)
- Mutual exclusion (similar to integrity constraint):
 - at most one value for each auction param

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Creating a Batch of Auctions

```
require "auctionGenerator.pl"; # simple Perl library

for ($i = 1; $i <= $ARGV[1]; $i++) {
    beginAuction();
    addRule("negotiationType(cda)");
    addRule("negotiationType(revealAll)");
    # could also have the rules in a file and use:
    # addFile("filename.clp");
    addParam("auctionname", "auction$i"); # uses override priority
    endAuction();
}

.
```

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Detailed ontology and configuration
criteria



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Configuration Criteria

- Feasibility/coherence
- Will it result in valid/sensible contracts?
- Expected performance
- Will it lead to desirable outcomes?
- Pareto efficiency
- Other measures of social utility
- Complexity
- How costly, for both operators and participants?
-
-
-
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Configuration Criteria: Complexity

- Agent complexity
 - Incentive compatibility
 - Bid format, iterations
- Computational complexity of mechanism
 - E.g., time complexity in number of agents/attributes
- Communication costs
- “Cognitive” complexity

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Configuring the Mechanism

(exploiting information from the contract template)

- Attribute hierarchy
- Orthogonality (w.r.t. siblings in hierarchy)
 - additive utility
 - vastly reduces search (eg, 10^4 vs. $2*10^2$)
- Separability
 - suggests combinatorial mechanisms
 - can be reasoned about (example)



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Hints from Contract Template, Continued

- Privacy (example)
- “Negotiability” of attributes
 - E.g., seller/buyer chooses
- Constraints
 - Declarative language well-suited
 - E.g., \sim hotel $<- \sim$ flight

Questions and Future Work

[NWU]

- Parameterize the space of negotiation mechanisms
- Other hints from the partial-contract language for configuring the negotiation
 - Reducing search costs
 - Meta-level hints/specifications
 - Other information influencing design choices

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Negotiation-level predicates and
examples of making aspects of an
executable contract negotiable




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Negotiation-level Predicates:

**attribute, separableComponent,
orthogonalComponent**

attribute(?Parent, ?Child).
separableComponent(hotel)...
orthogonalComponent(seatClass)...



price, quantity:
distinguished

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Negotiation-level Predicates: **negotiable**

negotiable(?PredicateName).

```
flight(?Airline, ?FromCity, ?ToCity, ?Stopovers) ←  
airline(?Airline) AND stopovers(?Stopovers) AND  
possibleRoute(?Airline, ?FromCity, ?ToCity).
```

negotiable('airline').

negotiable('stopovers').



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Negotiation-level Predicates: **negotiationType**

negotiationType(?PredicateName, ?TypeOfNegotiation).

negotiable('hotelCost').

negotiationType('hotelCost, sellerChooses).



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Composition of Contract Template (a.k.a., Partial Contract)

Rules Implementing Agreement

Negotiation-level Rules

Specific Predicates

- attribute
- separableComp.
- orthogonalComp.
- negotiable
- negotiationType

Constraints/
Dependencies:
Rules with
negotiable
predicates
as head



Adding Negotiation Constructs to Existing Contracts

- Negotiating the form of a rule

```
ruleHead ← ruleBody AND isRuleIncluded(yes).  
negotiable('isRuleIncluded').
```

Negotiation Mechanism

isRuleIncluded(yes).

isRuleIncluded(no).

Adding Negotiation Constructs to Existing Contracts (continued)

- Making constants negotiable

foo(constant1, constant2) ← conditions.

becomes

foo(?Var1, ?Var2) ← conditions AND
var1(?Var1) AND var2(?Var2).
negotiable('var1').
negotiable('var2').
• . . .

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CLP details and general ‘rules’
motivation



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Why Rules?

- Contract terms involve *conditional* relationships
 - Terms and conditions, e.g., rules for price discounting
 - Service provisions, e.g., rules for refunds
 - Surrounding business processes, e.g., rules for lead time to place an order
- Shared semantics
- Existing executable contracts can be easily parameterized without a meta-language
-

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Courteous LPs: Advantages


- Facilitate updating and merging.
- Expressive: classical negation, partially-ordered prioritization, reasoning to infer prioritization.
- Set of conclusions guaranteed **consistent, unique**.
 - Mutual exclusion is enforced. E.g., never conclude both p & $\neg p$.
- Efficient: low computational overhead beyond ordinary LPs.
 - Tractable given reasonable restrictions (Datalog, max vars/rule)
 - Extra cost is equivalent to increasing v to $(v+1)$ in ordinary LPs.
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
Detailed process (partial to complete)



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Negotiation Process



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
Overall Process (Partial → Complete)

Contract Template

Rules
Implementing
Agreement

Negotiation-level Rules

- Specific Predicates
 - attribute
 - separableComp.
 - orthogonalComp.
 - negotiable
 - negotiationType
- Constraints/ Dependencies:
Rules with negotiable predicates as head



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Miscellaneous



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Multidimensional Auctions

How to negotiate

Auctions: mediated, well-defined, market-based

Multidimensional: resolve multiple issues

Types

Multiple single-dimensional

Combinatorial

Multiattribute

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Size of Possible-Outcome Space

- Too big!
- Contract language can help
 - Declarative language well-suited for expressing constraints
 - Orthogonalities (eg, 10^4 vs. $2*10^2$)
 - Negotiation types (eg, sellerChooses)



Definition of Negotiation

- Negotiation = establishing a contract
- Example: Auction
 - Description of good with blanks for price/quantity
- Example: Negotiating ecommerce transactions
 - Results in an executable piece of code that executes the transaction
-

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BACKUP SLIDES

Intro/Motivation, General
Contracting



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Definition of a Contract

- Contract = Set of attributes and values
- Partial Contract: values unspecified
- Includes seemingly structural aspects
 - Example: whether to include a rule in a declarative contract

Formal Contracting Language

- Partial vs. Complete Contracts (Contract Templates vs. Executable Contracts)
- Unspecified terms reduced to “negotiable parameters”
 - Attributes with specified domains
- Contract language expresses both partial and complete contracts
 - Additional ontology for parameterizing the negotiable aspects
-

Negotiation from Contract Templates


- Structural aspects can be parameterized
 - Rule-based language allows boolean attributes to effectively include or omit clauses/terms from the contract
- Negotiation reduces to assignment of values to attributes

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Old stuff



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Alternative Negotiation Structures: Travel Packages Example

TODO: subset of possible TAC components

Pkg1

Pkg2

Pkg3

Airline
schedule
class
restrictions

Hotel
days
room
amenities

Airline
Hotel

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...and combinations thereof.

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Summary [NWU]

- Contracting language as infrastructure for automated contracting
- Partial contract reduces negotiation to attribute assignment
- Alternative negotiation structures and criteria for mechanisms
- How the contracting language can guide the configuration of mechanisms and improve their efficiency
-
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Discussion and Future Work

- Iterative negotiation
 - Situated Courteous Logic Programs:
 - procedural attachments for actions, queries
 - XML as common interlingua
 - Multidimensional negotiation mechanisms
-

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Summary [AIEC]

- CLP as basis for executable contracts
- CLP's prioritized conflict handling also facilitates modification during negotiation
- Introduced specific predicates for negotiation
 - Hierarchy of negotiables
 - Reason about what is negotiable and how
- Constraints and dependencies handled naturally
- Demonstrated how negotiation mechanism can transform a contract template to a fully executable contract
- Showed how to make an existing contract negotiable
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
SCRATCH






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Standard
English

Ascending

eBay

Amazon
Auctions

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Rule-based Contracts for E-commerce

- Rules as way to specify business processes as part of contract terms.
- Facilitates specification
 - by multiple authors, cross-enterprise, cross-application
 - by non-technical authors
 - dynamically
- Existing executable contracts can be easily parameterized without a meta-language
-

Courteous Logic Programming

- Generalization of Logic Programming to include **prioritized conflict handling**.
- Rules may override other rules
 - special cases / exceptions / defaults
 - more recent updates
 - higher-authority (and/or more reliable) sources
 - closed world: lowest priority for catch cases
- ..

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Example of Conflicting Rules

Vendor's rules that prescribe how buyer must place or modify an order:

- A) 14 days ahead if
 - buyer is a preferred customer
- B) 2 days ahead if
 - the modification is to reduce the quantity, and
 - the item is in backlog at the seller.

Resolved by precedence between the rules.

Often only *partial* order of precedence is justified.



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Example of Conflicting Rules in CLP

```
<leadTimeRule1>  
orderModificationNotice(?Buyer, ?Seller, ?Order, 14days) ←  
preferredCustomerOf(?Buyer, ?Seller).
```

```
<leadTimeRule2>  
orderModificationNotice(?Buyer, ?Seller, ?Order, 2days) ←  
preferredCustomerOf(?Buyer, ?Seller) AND  
orderModificationType(?Order, reduce) AND  
orderItemIsInBacklog(?Order).
```

Overrides(leadTimeRule2, leadTimeRule1).



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Configuring the Negotiation Example: Orthogonality vs. Separability

separable

NOT separable

orthogonal

Maps w/ car

Car color

Flight
(whether to get car depends on arrival city)

Car base price
depends on time needed, etc

NOT orthogonal

• • • • •

- How does our approach scale?
 - Grosof complexity results
 - the straightforward way to express possible negotiation outcomes doesn't scale... lots of things about our ontology address this
- How and what does the language make it easier to express?
- How have we exploited structure in a problem?
 - Component hierarchy, flight structure, etc


Other Uses for Prototype

- Generalization of Economy Generator
 - A few lines of CLP rules instead of 27 parameters
 - Rules of the form `auction(param, val)` also allowed, for specifying low-level parameters
 - Perl library for creating batches of auctions
 - Support for reasoning about alternative negotiation structures



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Contracting 1-2-3



Applies to any contracting, electronic or not.
May iterate or interleave these steps.
Boundaries not necessarily sharp.

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